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A B S T R A C T
Zero-deforestation commitments are a type of voluntary sustainability initiative that companies adopt to signal
their intention to reduce or eliminate deforestation associated with commodities that they produce, trade, and/
or sell. Because each company defines its own zero-deforestation commitment goals and implementation me-
chanisms, commitment content varies widely. This creates challenges for the assessment of commitment im-
plementation or effectiveness. Here, we develop criteria to assess the potential effectiveness of zero-deforestation
commitments at reducing deforestation within a company supply chain, regionally, and globally. We apply these
criteria to evaluate 52 zero-deforestation commitments made by companies identified by Forest 500 as having
high deforestation risk. While our assessment indicates that existing commitments converge with several criteria
for effectiveness, they fall short in a few key ways. First, they cover just a small share of the global market for
deforestation-risk commodities, which means that their global impact is likely to be small. Second, biome-wide
implementation is only achieved in the Brazilian Amazon. Outside this region, implementation occurs mainly
through certification programs, which are not adopted by all producers and lack third-party near-real time
deforestation monitoring. Additionally, around half of all commitments include zero-net deforestation targets
and future implementation deadlines, both of which are design elements that may reduce effectiveness. Zero-net
targets allow promises of future reforestation to compensate for current forest loss, while future implementation
deadlines allow for preemptive clearing. To increase the likelihood that commitments will lead to reduced
deforestation across all scales, more companies should adopt zero-gross deforestation targets with immediate
implementation deadlines and clear sanction-based implementation mechanisms in biomes with high risk of
forest to commodity conversion.
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In the last decade, most tropical deforestation has been driven by
the expansion of a handful of land-based commodities including palm
oil, soybeans, beef, and wood products (Curtis et al., 2018; Gibbs et al.,
2010; Henders et al., 2015). Many remaining forest areas have incurred
substantial degradation from selective logging for timber, pulp, and
paper (Pearson et al., 2014). Rapid expansion of these “forest-risk”
commodities within tropical regions has been driven by increases in
demand from population growth, changing consumer preferences, and
to a lesser extent government biofuel policies (Alexander et al., 2015;
Defries et al., 2010; Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011). Forest conversion
and logging for agriculture and timber production are associated with
substantial negative socio-environmental impacts, including land con-
flict, increased rural income inequality, greenhouse gas emissions,
biodiversity loss, and hydrological changes (Carlson et al., 2013;
Carlson and Garrett, 2018; Garrett and Rausch, 2015; Pearson et al.,
2014; Spera et al., 2016; Whitworth et al., 2018).
A relatively small number of large companies handle most trans-
portation, processing, and distribution of these forest-risk commodities
(Hoffman, 2013). Since the early 2000s many of these companies have
experienced increased scrutiny regarding their sourcing practices, in-
cluding pressure from civil society and governments. Examples include
Greenpeace’s name and shame campaigns (e.g. Greenpeace, 2006) and
the efforts of public prosecutors in Brazil to enforce domestic con-
servation regulation compliance on companies operating in the Amazon
(Gibbs et al., 2015; Merry and Soares-Filho, 2017). In response to this
pressure, many large companies have made public pledges to exclude
commodities produced by suppliers that have recently cleared or are
actively clearing land. These pledges are known as “zero-deforestation
commitments” (ZDCs) (Lambin et al., 2018). By 2017, at least 477
companies in forest risk-commodity supply chains had made a ZDC
(Donofrio et al., 2017).
ZDCs are voluntary sustainability initiatives that signal a company’s
intention to eliminate deforestation from its supply chain (Lambin
et al., 2018), and may aim to fill gaps in public forest governance
(Prakash and Potoski, 2007). Research on ZDC effectiveness is still
sparse, but a systematic review of work to date suggests that existing
ZDCs have had only limited success (Garrett et al., 2018). Companies
rarely report their progress and there have already been several high
profile cases of non-compliance by committed companies (Cuff, 2016).
Meanwhile, tropical deforestation continues at high rates (Hansen
et al., 2013).
A systematic assessment of these commitments and the conditions of
their implementation is urgently needed to improve their effectiveness
and capitalize on momentum among consumer goods companies
(Dauvergne, 2017). Well-designed and -implemented ZDCs could play
an important role in protecting native habitats given the limited ability
of individual companies or governments to affect global deforestation
levels due to leakage and other spillover effects. Thus, defining general
principles that may improve expected outcomes of ZDCs for both forests
and supply chain actors is essential. Such principles can be applied to
guide case study diagnoses of impacts and shortcomings of existing
agreements within individual regions and company supply chains, and
inform future synthetic research (e.g. Lambin et al. (2018)).
While Jopke and Schoneveld (2018) developed a set of indicators to
evaluate current ZDCs, no deductive approach has been used to provide
a theoretical framework that identifies the factors which are most likely
to generate commitments that achieve progress toward zero-defor-
estation at the global scale. Previous theoretical and empirical research
on voluntary sustainability initiative effectiveness has focused on cer-
tification programs (e.g. Auld et al., 2008b; Bush et al., 2013; Garrett
et al., 2016; Gulbrandsen, 2004). ZDCs differ from certification systems
in that they establish a company’s intention to reduce deforestation, but
do not always elaborate specific criteria, implementation mechanisms,
or third party assurances that are features of certification approaches
(Haupt et al., 2018; Lambin et al., 2018). A “middle range” theory of
effectiveness for ZDCs (one that provides general theory bounded by
particular contexts) (Meyfroidt et al., 2018) and associated assessment
criteria to evaluate the likely effectiveness of an individual pledge
would aid existing efforts to monitor company progress toward zero-
deforestation goals (e.g., Forest 500, SPOTT, Supply Change)(Milder
et al., 2015) and in efforts to standardize future commitments around
agreed upon characteristics (e.g., The Accountability Framework (ac-
countability-framework.org)).
Here we develop a framework to assess the potential effectiveness of
ZDCs in terms of their conservation outcomes: i) within individual
supply chains at the regional level, ii) across all sectoral actors at the
regional level, and iii) across all actors at the global level. In developing
this framework we draw on literature that describes the factors that
influence the effectiveness of any voluntary sustainability initiative
(Auld et al., 2008b, 2008a; Borck and Coglianese, 2009; Clapp, 2017;
Clapp and Thistlethwaite, 2012; van der Ven et al., 2018). Within this
general framework, we elaborate specific assessment criteria by which to
evaluate expected commitment effectiveness across these three scales.
Finally, we evaluate the 52 existing commitments from the 250 com-
panies tracked by the Forest 500 project (www.forest500.org) using
these assessment criteria. In our discussion, we expose tensions between
commitments that are most likely to result in reduced deforestation at
the global level, and commitments that are most likely to be agreeable
and/or technically implementable by companies.
2. Methods
We began our development of a conceptual framework of commit-
ment effectiveness as part of an interdisciplinary meeting of scientists
and practitioners engaged in the study and governance of food supply
chains held in November 2016 at the National Socio-Environmental
Synthesis Center (SESYNC) in Annapolis, United States. We then refined
this framework through literature review and in follow-up discussions
among this group, including a second meeting at SESYNC in June 2018.
The composition of our group was 50% from academia (US, Canada,
and Brazil), 44% from civil society (conservation NGOs and non-profit
research institutions), and 6% from the private sector (one major
commodity trader/processor). Through this process, we agreed upon a
framework that identified eleven criteria that are likely to play an im-
portant role in determining ZDC effectiveness.
We applied our criteria to empirical zero-deforestation commitment
data from the Forest 500 project (Global Canopy Programme, 2016).
This project uses trade, customs and market research data to purpose-
fully sample the 250 ‘powerbrokers’ who are likely to be most influ-
ential in reducing deforestation globally. Companies are included in the
Forest 500 project based on their risk of being linked to tropical de-
forestation and the volume of product that they produce and/or source
(Global Canopy Programme, 2015). The Forest 500 project conducts
assessments of company websites, including websites of subsidiaries, to
identify information on internal sustainability procedures related to
forest safeguards. Assessment items included overall forest policy,
commodity specific policies, operations, and reporting and transpar-
ency (Global Canopy Programme, 2015). We then matched, wherever
possible, the Forest 500 assessment items to the criteria included in our
conceptual framework of commitment effectiveness.
3. What makes a zero-deforestation commitment effective?
Companies make ZDCs for several reasons, including demonstrating
corporate social responsibility to protect market shares and reducing
the risk of potentially catastrophic reputational harm and supply dis-
ruptions (Rueda et al., 2017). Such benefits may be realized even if
commitments do not lead to stated goals or if goals are unverifiable
(i.e., green-washing). We define individual supply chain effective-
ness of ZDCs as elimination of deforestation among the company’s
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direct and indirect suppliers.
While a company’s ZDC typically focuses on “cleaning” its own
supply chain, conservation activists hope that ZDC fulfillment generates
regional or global forest protection. We define regional effectiveness
as eliminating deforestation among all producers of that com-
modity in the region. Net global effectiveness of ZDCs is achieved
when deforestation is eliminated in the regions where the com-
mitment is applied without increasing deforestation elsewhere. In
other words, a commitment is only regionally and globally effective if
avoided deforestation in the target supply chain is not displaced to
other actors, regions, times, or commodities (le Polain de Waroux et al.,
2017). For instance, if implementation of commitments pushes pro-
duction to areas with lower yields where more total land is required to
meet demand, or regions with higher conservation value, ZDCs could
cause greater damage than business as usual land cover change in the
original location (Carrasco et al., 2014). Additionally, a commitment
should not lead to pre-emptive clearing in expectation of future policy
adoption (Carlson et al., 2018).
Individual supply chain ZDC effectiveness is likely to be affected by
a policy’s stringency, contextual factors in the region of implementa-
tion, and the life cycle of the targeted commodity (Auld et al., 2008b;
Clapp, 2017; Garrett et al., 2016; Rueda et al., 2017; van der Ven et al.,
2018)(Fig. 1a). Policy stringency is determined by the commitment
content, including its deforestation reduction targets and the ‘forest’
definitions specified, and by commitment implementation, including
the degree of realization and type of mechanism. Contextual factors
include existing incentives for deforestation in the target supply chain
and the presence of reliable deforestation monitoring mechanisms for
suppliers, which are both influenced by the regulatory, political, and
financing environment in the region where the commitment is im-
plemented. Commodity life cycles differ substantially between live-
stock, crop, and timber. For instance, livestock are often born, reared,
and finished in different locations, involving trade between two or more
producers before being supplied to a committed company, which makes
it more difficult to trace a livestock product than a crop product to its
origin.
Regional and net global effectiveness is affected by the level of
participation of firms and their combined market share (Clapp, 2017;
Clapp and Thistlethwaite, 2012; van der Ven et al., 2018)(Fig. 1b), the
geographical reach of committed companies, and the negative and
positive spillovers arising from their commitments at the regional or
global scale (Fig. 1c). The extent of deforestation spillovers (effects on
non-targeted regions, actors, commodities, etc.), depends on the re-
gions, actors, and commodities covered by the commitment, com-
pliance cut-off dates, the fungibility of capital and labor markets,
technological responses to ZDC implementation, impacts of the com-
mitment on income, and the temporal and spatial implementation
pattern (Wunder, 2008). All factors that influence individual supply
chain ZDC effectiveness may impact regional and global effectiveness
through ripple effects on commodity and land markets (Atmadja and
Fig. 1. Framework for understanding the expected effectiveness of ZDCs. Green boxes indicate three scales at which effectiveness can be defined. Blue boxes indicate
criteria important for commitment effectiveness. Grey boxes highlight types of spillovers that can occur. Letters (a–d) focus on interactions between the boxes
(criteria, effectiveness, and spillovers), as referenced in the main text. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the
web version of this article).
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Verchot, 2012), just as regional effectiveness will influence global ef-
fectiveness.
Importantly, our framework recognizes the interaction between the
stringency of voluntary sustainability initiatives and the level of parti-
cipation by firms (Borck and Coglianese, 2009)(Fig. 1d). Some firms
may be more likely to adopt a less stringent ZDC that they can apply
globally (Auld et al., 2008b), while other firms may be more likely to
adopt a more stringent ZDC that applies to a single region. A less
stringent ZDC that applies globally and reduces spillovers could have
more or less net global effectiveness as a ZDC that is more stringent in
the region where it is applied and leads to deforestation spillovers in
other regions (Borck and Coglianese, 2009).
Our definition of ZDC effectiveness builds on definitions used in
related work about voluntary sustainability initiatives (e.g., Auld et al.,
2008b; Borck and Coglianese, 2009) by differentiating three scales of
effectiveness: individual, regional and global. This is necessary because
of the diverse goals of the actors undertaking and negotiating ZDCs and
because it allows us to separate out the effects of market shares and
spillovers on effectiveness at broader scales from the issue of effec-
tiveness within individual supply chains. Nonetheless, our concept of
individual supply chain effectiveness is similar to the concept of “direct
effects” proposed in Auld et al. (2008b) and “average effect by parti-
cipant” in Borck and Coglianese (2009). Regional and global supply
chain effectiveness incorporate the “number of participants” and
“spillovers” (Borck and Coglianese, 2009), or what Auld et al. (2008b)
refer to as “broader implications”.
4. Conceptual framework
This section explains in more detail how the various factors in-
troduced in section 3 (and Fig. 1) influence the individual supply chain,
regional, and net global effectiveness of ZDCs. Resulting criteria for
effective commitment design, numbered CX, are presented in bold at
the conclusion of each section.
4.1. Stringency and implementation factors that influence individual supply
chain effectiveness (Fig. 1a)
4.1.1. Commitment characteristics
Deforestation reduction targets: ZDCs describe deforestation in
several ways, including zero-net, zero-gross, and zero-illegal deforesta-
tion, each of which has different implications for forests (Brown and
Zarin, 2013; Lambin et al., 2018). A zero-net commitment allows re-
forestation to compensate for forest loss, such that there is no overall
change in the amount of forest. In contrast, a zero-gross commitment
prohibits all deforestation. These two targets may sometimes exceed
public legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms, while a zero-
illegal deforestation commitment would merely better align the com-
pany’s activities with existing government regulations.
In theory, zero-net deforestation mechanisms could enable compa-
nies to clear forests with low carbon or biodiversity but high potential
for agricultural production in exchange for forest restoration in lower
productivity lands or those where restoration could yield substantial
conservation benefits. In practice, however, commitments to zero-net
deforestation rarely include rigorous mechanisms to ensure that off-
setting generates these ecological benefits and are likely to lead to a
delay in potential forest sparing benefits (van der Ven et al., 2018).
Furthermore, zero-net deforestation approaches can mask loss of nat-
ural ecosystems due to failure to monitor or maintain transparent re-
gistries, or when they lead to a transition towards planted forests with
low ecological integrity (Brown and Zarin, 2013; Tropek et al., 2014).
A zero-illegal deforestation target is likely to be the least stringent,
since few jurisdictions fully prohibit deforestation (Garrett et al., 2016).
Zero-illegal targets are also, by definition, unlikely to lead to any ad-
ditional conservation in regions where laws are already well enforced.
Notably, none of these targets require the demonstration of
“additionality” in reduced deforestation. That is, a company is not re-
quired to prove that they reduced deforestation beyond what would
have occurred under business as usual practices, either regionally or
globally.
C1: ZDCs with a zero-gross deforestation target are more likely
to be effective.
Definition of forests: How forests are defined in ZDCs can be highly
contentious, because this affects the lands available for expansion and
the costs of monitoring for compliance (Romijn et al., 2012; Sasaki and
Putz, 2009). By implicitly or explicitly excluding certain types of eco-
systems in their discussions of forests, civil society, states, and com-
panies can influence which locations and land uses are targeted by
“deforestation” commitments. Partly due to this lack of consensus,
various definitions of deforestation – or no definition at all – are used in
international conservation discussions (Chazdon et al., 2016). If a forest
definition is limited, for example, to vegetation with more than 30%
canopy cover, then it will protect a smaller area than if a more com-
prehensive definition were used, which can undermine the broader
global effectiveness. Specifically, it may fail to cover other areas that
still have high conservation value and high carbon stocks, such as de-
forested peatlands, agroforests, savannas, dry forests, and heavily
logged forests (Garrett et al., 2016). Nevertheless, using a less inclusive
forest definition may encourage earlier and more widespread partici-
pation in ZDCs, because it reduces adoption costs (Clapp and
Thistlethwaite, 2012).
In response to specific concerns about conservation of ecosystem
function and carbon sequestration, formal procedures have been de-
veloped for designating places as “High Conservation Value” (HCV) or
“High Carbon Stock” (HCS) (Table S1). These designations, particularly
HCV, are more inclusive than a definition that focuses only on canopy
cover. HCV measures conservation value based on the ecosystem’s
biological, ecological, social, or cultural values. These values may favor
large landscape-level areas of forest, but also protect rare species and
habitats and high concentrations of wildlife, even if the area is small or
has limited canopy cover (Edwards and Laurance, 2012). HCS distin-
guishes forests with high carbon and biodiversity value from degraded
lands based on vegetation class, validated by above ground biomass
measurements and field observations, but does not include social, cul-
tural, or biodiversity criteria.
C2: ZDCs with more inclusive forest definitions, such as those
defined by High Conservation Value and High Carbon Stock,
are more likely to be effective.
Implementation and compliance mechanisms: Regional effective-
ness depends on a functional system of monitoring and verification of
compliance at a manageable spatial unit, whether it be a property,
cooperative, or jurisdiction. Attributes of functional monitoring and
verification include traceability mechanisms, near real-time deforesta-
tion detection, and a record of infractions that can be checked at point
of sale (Haupt et al., 2018). Traceability mechanisms link suppliers to a
specific place. An example is the Brazilian public Rural Environmental
Registry (CAR) (Roitman et al., 2018). Near real-time deforestation
monitoring is the ability to map changes in agreed upon definitions of
forest area within a matter of weeks (Reiche et al., 2015). Databases or
lists recording deforestation infractions by suppliers or potential sup-
pliers must be accessible at the point of sale for the buyer to verify that
suppliers have not deforested after the agreed upon cutoff date. Com-
pliance system establishment is influenced by the existence of private or
collective property rights and by the ability of producers to map and
register their properties (Gaveau et al., 2017; L’Roe et al., 2016). Even
when clear property rights exist, compliance mechanisms can suffer
from loopholes, such as ownership of multiple properties under dif-
ferent names, strategic registration of only parts of properties, defor-
estation monitoring only on the part of the property that produces the
product in question, and renting land for production (L’Roe et al., 2016;
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Rausch and Gibbs, 2016).
Implementation and compliance mechanisms for ZDCs include in-
centive- and sanction-based standards (Garrett et al., 2018; Lambin
et al., 2018). Incentive-based standards are industry-wide protocols,
such as certification programs, which aim to provide a benefit to in-
dividual producers for reducing deforestation (e.g., price premium,
enhanced market access). Sanction-based standards (e.g., bans, mor-
atoria) target individual properties or entire jurisdictions and establish
a penalty for deforestation, typically by way of market exclusion. The
leading incentive-based standards used for the implementation of palm
oil, soy, timber, and pulp and paper ZDCs are the Roundtable on Sus-
tainable Palm Oil (RSPO), Round Table on Responsible Soybeans
(RTRS), Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), and Programme for the
Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC) (Table S1). These standards
may be adopted by individual farms and plantations and actors further
down the supply chain to certify the entire “chain of custody”. Promi-
nent examples of private, sanction-based, commodity standards include
Brazil’s Soy Moratorium and G4 Cattle Agreement, and the Chilean
Joint Solutions Project (for timber), which have been adopted by tra-
ders and processers (including slaughterhouses and mills).
The Soy Moratorium and the G4 Cattle Agreement in the Brazilian
Amazon offer the most robust systems of monitoring and verification of
deforestation activities by suppliers. They rely heavily on the CAR,
which enables near real-time deforestation monitoring systems to link
deforestation events to individual property owners that can be verified
at the point of sale (Azevedo et al., 2017; Garrett et al., 2013). How-
ever, these mechanisms currently only allow verificaiton of deforesta-
tion activities by direct suppliers to the grain or cattle traders and
processers. This creates opportunities for laundering (obscuring the
origin of a product) and continued deforestation among indirect sup-
pliers (Klingler et al., 2018; Rausch and Gibbs, 2016). Near real-time
monitoring and verification are not yet implemented within most cer-
tification systems and as a result put the burden for proving compliance
on producers, a process which can be influenced by local institutions
(see C5) (Dauvergne, 2018). Selection bias, or adoption by producers
that have already achieved desired changes in practices, is another
important challenge for certification programs and other implementa-
tion mechanisms that rely on voluntary adoption by producers (Lambin
et al., 2018).
C3: ZDCs with a functional, transparent system of compliance
monitoring and verification for direct and indirect suppliers
are more likely to be effective.
4.1.2. Implementation context
Presence of reliable geospatial forest information: As mentioned above,
monitoring and verifying deforestation requires an agreed-upon defi-
nition and map of changes in forest area. Annual maps of forest cover
and deforestation with sufficient accuracy to discern deforestation from
other types of tree cover loss are only now becoming available for many
parts of the tropics (Hansen et al., 2013; Romijn et al., 2015). Me-
chanisms for near real-time detection of deforestation and methods for
detecting selective logging and degradation are becoming more
common, but they are not yet linked with land registries, which inhibits
detection of culpableparties. Committed companies are often able to
overcome public deforestation data limitations by working with NGOs
and private consultancies to monitor deforestation in high risk areas.
But these monitoring systems, arising from outside the public govern-
ance sphere, may have less political legitimacy than public or hybrid
efforts.
C4: ZDCs that target a region with reliable geospatial forest
information are more likely to be effective.
Regulatory, political, and financing environment: Producers are
more likely to comply with a downstream commitment when the dis-
incentives (penalties) for non-compliance exceed the costs of
compliance, or when the incentives (payments or rewards) for com-
pliance exceed the benefits of non-compliance (Börner et al., 2015). The
degree to which a commitment results in changes in deforestation in-
centives is influenced by the regional regulatory, political, and finan-
cing environment (Lambin et al., 2014; Lambin and Thorkalson, 2018).
If a government provides additional disincentives for deforestation,
such as jail time, financial penalties, credit restrictions for non-com-
pliant individuals and companies, and credit restrictions for whole re-
gions with high deforestation rates, these actions can have a synergistic
effect with the policies of private companies (Nepstad et al., 2014).
Synergistic public policies can improve the likelihood that a company
will meet its own deforestation targets, but overlap with existing public
protections may reduce commitment additionality (Garrett et al.,
2016). Governments can create policies that are openly contradictory to
ZDCs (e.g., by requiring land leases to be developed via land clearing),
creating conflicts for their implementation in certain regions (Lambin
and Thorkalson, 2018).
Changing policies and inconsistent enforcement in the regions
where ZDCs are adopted will also affect the abilities of companies = to
successfully implement their commitments (Gnych et al., 2015; Rausch
and Gibbs, 2016). Corruption and patrimonialism can undermine the
reliability of information, statistics, and claims. Such issues may pollute
certification standards, where governments and NGOs certify illegal
commodities as “sustainable” using forged documents, as has occurred
for palm oil (Dauvergne, 2018). In these political contexts, reported
data on supplier compliance may be inaccurate or misleading.
C5: ZDCs that target a region with mutually reinforcing reg-
ulatory, political, and financing conditions, such as additional
disincentives for deforestation, are more likely to be effective.
Deforestation threats: The additional impact of a voluntary sus-
tainability initiative in conserving forests beyond business as usual
trends is likely to be higher when it targets a region with high forest-to-
agriculture conversion rates (Wunder, 2005; Wunder et al., 2008). If a
commitment is targeted at a place with low rates of deforestation for
agricultural expansion, it may succeed in eliminating deforestation lo-
cally, but have little impact on global deforestation (Garrett et al.,
2016). Due to the size of the threat in these regions, net post-inter-
vention deforestation may remain higher than other regions. On the
other hand, ZDCs that only target regions with high forest-to-agri-
culture conversion rates are more likely to result in leakage of defor-
estation activities to other ecosystems, especially if the targeted region
contributes substantially to global production (or production growth)
(le Polain de Waroux et al., 2017).
C6: ZDCs that target a region with high forest-to-agriculture
conversion rates are more likely to be effective.
Considering the full implementation context, the presence of reli-
able geospatial forest information, and synergistic regulatory, political,
and financing conditions are likely to co-occur. However, there may be
an inverse relationship between and these two criteria and high existing
forest-to-agriculture conversion rates. Though the Brazilian Amazon is
an example of a region where all three conditions co-occur (Garrett
et al., 2016). To increase additionality and global effectiveness, ZDCs
should prioritize areas that are most under threat of deforestation,
while working with countries in the regions of implementation to
achieve reliable geospatial information and synergistic regulatory, po-
litical, and financing conditions. This may make implementation of the
ZDC more challenging in the short-run, but will ultimately improve
both private and public deforestation governance capacity.
4.2. Market share of ZDCs and its influence on regional and global
effectiveness (Fig. 1b)
Civil society pressure to adopt commitments has focused on firms
that handle the greatest proportions of major deforestation-linked
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commodities (e.g., ADM, Cargill, IOI, Wilmar, Bunge) under the as-
sumption that commitments from such companies are likely to have the
largest direct impact on deforestation and could pressure other com-
panies to follow suit. This is particularly the case in commodity chains
where traders, processors, and retailers have a strong influence over
producers (i.e., buyer-driven or bilateral oligopoly chains) (Gereffi
et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2012).
Low market share is often given as a primary reason why voluntary
sustainability initiatives have failed to slow global deforestation (Clapp,
2017; van der Ven et al., 2018). Yet, as the proportion of the market
affected by commitments grows, the likelihood that it will affect global
supply and alter commodity prices increases. Particularly, if the costs of
complying with commitments are high, it could generate a switch to-
wards producing substitute commodities, particularly if they are highly
fungible (van der Ven et al., 2018). If higher costs lead to a decline in
global production (or a decline in production growth relative to de-
mand growth), it could result in higher global prices for the target
commodity, incentivizing farming of that commodity in new areas
where it was previously unprofitable (Villoria and Hertel, 2011).
Leakage will be only be minimized once the entire global market for a
particular commodity and its substitutes in consumption are fully
covered by ZDCs with comparable levels of implementation and com-
pliance (Garrett et al., 2017).
C7: ZDCs are more likely to be effective when adopted by
companies that collectively have a large global market share,
though risks of leakage may increase until the entire market is
covered by commitments.
4.3. Stringency and implementation factors that influence spillovers
(Fig. 1c)
Deforestation cut-off dates and implementation deadlines:
Deforestation “cut-off dates” and implementation deadlines vary widely
across voluntary sustainability initiatives (Potts et al., 2014). The fur-
ther into the future that a deforestation cut-off date is established or a
commitment is implemented, the more likely the commitment will re-
sult in a surge in deforestation prior to the cut-off date or im-
plementation deadline (Carlson et al., 2018; Jopke and Schoneveld,
2018). Even immediate cut-off dates and implementation deadlines are
not without issues, as they offer amnesty for past deforestation and/or
illegality, which may undermine other actors’ motivation to conserve
(Pasiecznik and Savenije, 2017; Roriz et al., 2017). Immediate cut-off
dates may also result in the exclusion of suppliers who could have been
persuaded to stop clearing. Immediate exclusion from the committed
company’s supply chain may incentivize these actors to continue
clearing and to sell to uncommitted buyers, creating a twin-track
marketplace. Given this tension, it may be more beneficial to set im-
mediate deadlines for implementation, but work with potentially
marginalized suppliers to achieve short-term, rather than immediate
deforestation cut-off dates, so long as those actors demonstrate a clear
plan for eliminating deforestation by the target date.
C8: ZDCs with immediate implementation deadlines and that
work with suppliers to establish immediate deforestation cut-
off dates or a clear plan for eliminating deforestation are more
likely to be effective.
Regions covered by the commitment: Commitments that target
small areas may be effective regionally, since corporations with pledges
could theoretically direct more resources to enforcing compliance in
that place versus spreading resources across many locations. However,
regional effectiveness may generate displacement of deforestation to
other actors or regions without ZDCs. If alternative suitable areas for
the commodity exist, and capital is mobile across borders, then activity
leakage between regions is more likely (le Polain de Waroux et al.,
2017).
In the past, many state and voluntary sustainability initiatives,
particularly in South America, have been biased toward intact humid
tropical forest ecosystems (i.e., “rainforests”) (Brannstrom, 2009). As a
result, past agricultural expansion is thought to have been deflected to
other ecosystems or “sacrifice zones”, including savannas and wood-
lands (Oliveira and Hecht, 2016), but this type of leakage has not yet
been identified empirically (le Polain de Waroux et al., 2017). Simi-
larly, some ZDCs or the companies implementing such commitments
cover only specific biomes, countries, or administrative regions. When a
company with global operations only implements a commitment within
a single region, this decision is may be a reaction to pressure from civil
society (e.g., the response of soy traders to Greenpeace’s name and
shame campaigns in the Brazilian Amazon).
C9: ZDCs that include all biomes at risk of deforestation are
more likely to be effective. This criterion is inherently related to
C2, which calls for more inclusive forest definitions.
Supply chain actors covered by the commitment: Commitments
that cover only direct suppliers to a trader or processing facility may
create opportunities and incentives for indirect suppliers to deforest.
For example, a commitment that pertains only to cattle fattening op-
erations may allow for continued deforestation among calf producers
that sell to fattening operations (Alix-Garcia and Gibbs, 2017). Some
crops (e.g., oil palm) might be more difficult to trace from location of
production to point of sale due to losses of genetic information and the
degree to which products from various origins are mixed at the pro-
cessing stage (Pasiecznik and Savenije, 2017). The application of
standards to the primary source of a supply chain thus requires use of
comprehensive traceability mechanisms that track the product from its
origin to point of sale to the final point of retail or consumption (Bosona
and Gebresenbet, 2013; Gardner et al., 2018).
C10: ZDCs that include responsibility for deforestation among
indirect suppliers and monitoring and traceability to the point
of origin are more likely to be effective. This criterion is in-
herently related to C3, which calls for a functional, transparent
system of compliance monitoring and verification among suppliers.
Commodities covered by the commitment: Spillovers between
supply chains for different commodities can result from commitments
that do not cover potential substitutes that are linked through demand
or land markets. For example, commitments limited to oil palm could
lead to increases in the price of vegetable oil and enhance the incentives
to expand other oilseed crops with potentially lower yields at the ex-
pense of forests in other regions. Alternatively, a commitment limited to
soy products, for example, could incentivize a producer to grow soy-
bean on part of the property that was cleared prior to the deforestation
cut-off date, while continuing to produce other commodities, such as
beef cattle or maize, on more recently cleared land (Rausch and Gibbs,
2016).
C11: ZDCs that cover more forest-risk commodities, including
oil palm, soybean, beef and leather, timber, and pulp and
paper, are more likely to be effective.
4.4. Interactions between stringency, implementation, the footprint of
all participants, and spillovers (Fig. 1a-d)
The impact of an individual zero-deforestation commitment, which
influences individual supply chain effectiveness, and the market share
of all commitments, which influences regional effectiveness, affect the
likelihood of spillovers between actors, supply chains, and regions. If a
committed actor sources from a limited geographical region but con-
trols a large share of the market in that region, then its commitment
may be highly effective in conserving forests regionally. However, this
limited geographic extent also increases the likelihood of deforestation
spillovers to other regions (Atmadja and Verchot, 2012; Henders and
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Ostwald, 2012; le Polain de Waroux et al., 2017). Conversely, an actor
may have a large geographical reach, but control very little of any given
regional market. In this situation, a zero-deforestation commitment
could be easily implemented within that company’s individual supply
chain if they source only from buyers occupying previously cleared
lands. Yet, if the other actors in the region do not adopt the commit-
ment simultaneously, then the actors who continue to clear land can
sell their product to other companies, undermining both regional and
global effectiveness.
5. How do current commitments align with these criteria?
To evaluate the potential effectiveness of current commitments and
areas in need of improvement, we examine Forest 500′s 2016 assess-
ment of the 250 most influential companies in the deforestation
economy (Global Canopy Programme, 2016, 2015). Specifically, we
assess how these companies’ commitments compare with our proposed
criteria for evaluating expected effectiveness. Our findings are sum-
marized with respect to each criterion in Fig. 2 and Table 1, while
summary statistics for the commitment data are presented in Table S1.
In 2016, only 21% of the 250 companies tracked by Forest 500 (52
companies) had made a ZDC. Companies with commitments were
predominantly publically traded (79%) and larger than those without
commitments (median USD$ 14.8 billion for committed, USD$ 9.3
billion for uncommitted). Collectively, the value of committed compa-
nies was USD $1.3 trillion, 27% of the value of all companies tracked.
Most of the companies with ZDCs (77%) were incorporated in the
United States or Europe.
5.1. Stringency and implementation factors that influence individual supply
chain effectiveness
Deforestation reduction targets (C1): Of the companies with a ZDC,
56% had committed to zero-gross deforestation, while 44% of com-
mitments utilize a zero-net target. Breaking this into commitment type,
48% of ZDCs that pertain to all commodities handled by a company set
a zero-gross target, while 52% set a zero-net target. All palm and beef
specific ZDCs set zero-gross targets (Fig. 2). Data on the use of zero-
illegal deforestation targets was not captured in the 2016 Forest 500
assessment.
Definition of forests (C2): Nearly all ZDCs (94%) had some defi-
nition of deforestation, with most relying on HCV (89% of ZDCs) and
HCS (64% of ZDCs) designations to define areas that cannot be cleared
(Table 1). The two beef specific commitments, which are constrained to
the Brazilian Amazon, did not use HCV designations to define areas that
cannot be cleared. HCV and HCS methodologies require on-the-ground
expert assessments to correctly identify set-aside areas and therefore do
not enable remote identification, and a lack of adequate mapping in-
hibits monitoring of changes in designated HCV and HCS areas (Carlson
et al., 2018).
Implementation and compliance mechanisms (C3): Most commit-
ments (88%) referenced incentive-based sectoral standards (i.e., certi-
fication programs) that have a historical cutoff date for deforestation
(Table S1) as their approach for implementation. All oil palm specific
commitments (n= 6) stated that they will use RSPO to implement their
commitment, but neither of the two beef specific commitments re-
ference certifications. Only 3% of the non-commodity specific com-
mitments reference sanction-based sectoral standards (i.e., market
Fig. 2. Commitment attributes by “type” (palm or beef specific or universal) for the companies tracked by Forest 500 with ZDCs (n= 52) as of 2016. These 52
companies comprise 21% of the 250 companies tracked by Forest 500. Most of the ZDCs (n= 44) are not commodity specific (i.e. “universal”). There were six palm
oil specific commitments and two beef specific commitments. All palm oil and beef specific commitments set a zero-gross deforestation target (a), while just over half
(52%) of universal commitments set a zero-net target (b). Most commitments, except for beef specific commitments, have global coverage (c), implement through
existing certification programs (g), and use HCV to identify areas not to be cleared (e). Aside from the two beef specific commitments, few commitments have
immediate implementation deadlines (d). Conversely, most commitments except the beef commitments, include all suppliers (h).
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exclusion mechanisms) - the Soy Moratorium or the G4 Cattle
Agreement - as their method for implementation and these specific
mechanisms are only used in the Brazilian Amazon.
Implementation context: While 91% of non-commodity specific
ZDCs and 100% of palm specific ZDCs were global in scope, their im-
plementation is limited to places where committed actors source forest-
risk products and where functional monitoring and verification me-
chanisms to implement the commitment exist. Since existing ZDCs have
not yet been mapped it is not possible to fully assess their im-
plementation context. However, it is clear from the implementation
mechanisms represented in existing commitments covered by Forest
500 that the first regions targeted include Indonesia and Malaysia for
palm oil (where most RSPO certified area occurs) and the Brazilian
Amazon for soy and cattle products (the current scope of the Soy
Moratorium and G4 Cattle Agreement). The focal region for timber and
pulp and paper is less clear, since FSC and PEFC certified lands are
primarily located in North America and Europe (84% of FSC certified
land) and occur throughout the tropics (∼25 million hectares certified
across Latin and South America, Africa, and Asia as of 2012) (FSC,
2012). Other sanction-based sectoral standards in the timber sector
(e.g. the Joint Solutions Projects in both Chile and British Columbia)
have had a similar geographic bias towards temperate forests (Heilmayr
and Lambin, 2016).
Reliable geospatial information (C4): Deforestation control in the
Brazilian Amazon and Cerrado is aided by highly-regarded geospatial
information on forest area and near real time detection of potential
deforestation using MODIS data (a system called DETER), as well as
additional less frequent monitoring to, higher-accuracy systems that
track deforestation, selective logging, and degradation (Diniz et al.,
2015; INPE, 2018; Rajão et al., 2017). National forest monitoring and
reporting has also improved substantially in other tropical geographies
since 2005 (Romijn et al., 2015). Annual forest cover monitoring, as
well as high-frequency deforestation alert systems, now exist via the
University of Maryland GLAD Forest Alert system linked to Global
Forest Watch (https://glad.umd.edu/dataset/glad-forest-alerts). How-
ever, these systems differ widely in their public acceptance and formal
integration into government enforcement. In contrast to most other
deforestation detection and monitoring systems, Brazil’s DETER stands
out for being able to provide a commonly agreed upon baseline against
which violations of both public and private policies can be assessed.
Mutually reinforcing regulatory, political, and financing condi-
tions (C5): Policies, politics, and financing in the Amazon tend to be
synergistic with voluntary sustainability initiatives, while conditions in
Indonesia are antagonistic (Lambin et al., 2014; Nepstad et al., 2014).
Through the Brazilian Forest Code and Plan for the Prevention and
Control of Deforestation in the Amazon, the Brazilian government has
established restrictions on deforestation on private properties and
vastly increased the scope of public land in protected areas and mon-
itoring and enforcement of deforestation on private properties (le
Polain de Waroux et al., 2017). Though there are limits to its effec-
tiveness, the Brazilian deforestation control system is implemented
through a property registration system, near real-time deforestation
tracking, and credit restrictions (Azevedo et al., 2017; Gibbs et al.,
2015; Nepstad et al., 2014). In Indonesia, recent legislation requires
that oil palm companies develop all available land within their plan-
tations (Ruysschaert and Salles, 2014), which may force oil palm
growers to choose between achieving legality and meeting their com-
mitments. In temperate countries forest protections on private lands
tend to be low, but are not necessarily antagonistic to ZDCs (Garrett
et al., 2016; McDermott et al., 2010).
High forest-to-agriculture conversion rates (C6): For decades the
Brazilian Amazon has had very high forest-to-agriculture conversion
rates, though these rates declined in 2005, while Indonesia and
Malaysia have had high forest to oil palm conversion rates (Curtis et al.,
2018; Garrett et al., 2016). Examinations at the producer level suggest
that oil palm certification is adopted mostly in places cleared for
agriculture long ago (Carlson et al., 2018). In North America and
Europe forest-to-plantation conversion rates tend to be low, but forestry
is the leading driver of deforestation (Curtis et al., 2018).
5.2. Market share of all participants, which influences regional supply chain
effectiveness
Market share (C7): The Forest 500 program targets larger compa-
nies. Yet precise data on each company’s market share for specific
commodities in forest risk regions is lacking across all known reporting
initiatives (CDP Forests Program, Forest 500, SPOTT, Supply Change,
and UCS and WWF Scorecards). Climate Focus used data on company
handled volumes of palm oil, soy, and cattle that was self-reported to
CDP in 2017 and pulp and paper volumes reported by RISI and by
companies in their public reports to assess the total volume of each
major forest risk commodity handled by companies who have any type
of deforestation policy (NYDF Assessment Partners (2018), Personal
Communication with Climate Focus). They then used global production
volumes reported by the United States Department of Agriculture and
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization to assess the pro-
portion of global production covered by companies with any defor-
estation policy. This includes a commitment ‘to reduce or remove de-
forestation and forest degradation from the company's direct operations
and/or supply chains’ for soy, palm and cattle. For pulp and paper, it
pertains to broader commitments that include ‘not sourcing from HCV’,
‘sourcing certified material’ and also ‘zero-deforestation and degrada-
tion’.
In 2017, for the 64 palm oil companies that reported their volumes,
83% had some deforestation policy and handled 65% of total global
production. For soy, out of 30 companies, 63% had some deforestation
policy and accounted for 11% of total global soy production. For cattle
products, 18 of 25 companies (72%), controlling 11% of total global
cattle meat production, had some deforestation policy. For paper and
pulp, Climate Focus assessed 20 of the largest companies with opera-
tions in Asia and Latin America. Out of 20 companies, 70% controlled
12% of global production and had some deforestation policy. The
market shares for oil palm, soy, and cattle are the amount of product
handled by the company globally - not the amount handled in defor-
estation risk regions and pertain to companies with any type of defor-
estation policy - not just companies with zero-gross or zero-net com-
mitments. Thus, they are likely overestimates of zero-gross and zero-net
commitment coverage for these three commodities in forest risk re-
gions. Pulp and paper estimates were constrained to Asia and Latin
America and thus may be underestimates of commitment coverage.
The Transparency for Sustainable Economies Initiative of the
Stockholm Environment Institute and Global Canopy (www.trase.earth)
has compiled municipal level data on the amount of soy exported from
Brazil by companies with a ZDC, including signatories to the Soy
Moratorium. In 2016, 28 million tons - 42.2% of all soy exports from
Brazil - were covered by ZDCs made by soy traders, including both
company specific commitments and the Soy Moratorium. RSPO, the
leading implementation mechanism for Palm Oil commitments (as re-
ported above), covers around 20% of global oil palm production in
2018 (www.rspo.org). RTRS is estimated to cover less than 2% of the
global soybean market (www.responsiblesoy.org).
5.3. Stringency and implementation factors that influence spillovers
Deforestation cut-off dates and implementation deadlines (C8):
One hundred percent of beef specific commitments and roughly half of
non-commodity specific commitments made by 2016 stated an im-
mediate (2016 or 2017) target date for implementation. Palm specific
commitments had the fewest ZDCs with immediate implementation
dates, while 50% of these ZDCs specified 2020 and 17% did not specify
a date. Forest 500 did not collect data on whether or not a deforestation
cut-off date for suppliers was specified in the commitment, but dates
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can be inferred by the cut-off date in the implementation mechanisms
mentioned in the commitment text (described in Table S1). RSPO sets a
cutoff date for HCV clearing of 2005, RTRS of 2009, and FSC of 1994.
The Soy Moratorium sets a cutoff date for forest clearing of 2008, the
G4 Cattle Agreement of 2009, the Joint Solutions Project of 2001. PEFC
does not specify a cutoff date.
Regions covered by the commitment (C9): Ninety-one percent of
non-commodity specific ZDCs and all six palm specific ZDCs were
global in scope. The two beef specific commitments were limited to the
Amazon. Yet, regional coverage is limited by the current scope of the
implementation mechanisms. For soy and cattle commitments, there is
large-scale coverage in the Brazilian Amazon via implementation
through the Soy Moratorium and G4 Cattle Agreement. 100% of palm
specific ZDCs rely on RSPO certification, with most coverage in
Indonesia and Malaysia (Garrett et al., 2016). Most timber and pulp and
paper companies implement their commitment through the FSC and
PEFC certification programs, which have the greatest coverage in North
America and Europe (FSC, 2012; McDermott et al., 2010).
Supply chain actors covered by the commitment (C10): Most
commitments claim to cover every node of the supply chain, but some
sanction-based implementation mechanisms lack the ability to trace
suppliers to the farm level. The two beef specific commitments do not
specify responsibility for farms that provide calves or stockers to cattle
finishing operations. They only cover direct suppliers.
Commodities covered by the commitment (C11): Most ZDCs (85%)
set a deforestation target that applies to all commodities that the
company handles (sources or trades), but few firms handle more than
one major tropical risk commodity. Of the 44 ZDCs that cover all
commodities, only four (2%) are by companies that handle all five
forest risk commodities (palm, soy, beef, timber, and pulp), nine (20%)
are by companies that handle palm and soy, seven (16%) are by com-
panies that handle soy and beef, and six (14%) are by companies that
handle timber and pulp. There were only eight ZDCs that were limited
to a single commodity (six for palm oil and two for beef).
6. Discussion
6.1. Existing zero-deforestation commitments show only moderate
convergence with effectiveness criteria and have substantial room for
improvement
Existing ZDCs have, on average, moderate convergence with the
effectiveness criteria identified by this study (high convergence - 3
criteria, moderate - 6, and low - 2) (Table 1). They align the most in
terms of their pledged geographical scope, accountability for indirect
suppliers, and inclusiveness of multiple forest-risk commodities. Areas
of moderate convergence include: i) deforestation targets - only half of
ZDCs set zero-gross deforestation targets; ii) cut-off dates and im-
plementation deadline - most ZDCs rely heavily on existing certification
programs or market exclusion mechanisms with immediate or historic
deforestation cutoff dates, but lack immediate implementation dead-
lines; iii) implementation mechanisms - biome-wide implementation
exists only in the Brazilian Amazon for soy and beef cattle; and iv)
implementation context - only a few of the initial implementation re-
gions include ecosystems with high forest-to-agriculture conversion
rates (Brazilian Amazon, Indonesia, and Malaysia) and reliable geos-
patial forest information linked to a property registry and additional
disincentives for deforestation (Brazilian Amazon).
Existing ZDCs have low convergence in terms of current market
share and their references to biome-wide implementation mechanisms.
Volumes handled by committed companies are< 12% of the global
market for most commodities. Though committed palm oil companies
comprise a majority of the global market, their implementation me-
chanism - RSPO - only covers 20% of oil palm area. Most commitments
rely on certifications for implementation, which lack third party near-
real time deforestation monitoring systems and put the burden for
proving compliance on producers. Adoption of zero-deforestation cer-
tifications is very low for soy and adoption of timber, pulp, and paper
certification is skewed toward temperate regions with lower rates of
forest conversion. Though most ZDCs include accountability for indirect
suppliers, a major gap in beef commitments is the failure to develop a
functional compliance system for indirect suppliers (Alix-Garcia and
Gibbs, 2017; Klingler et al., 2018).
Companies that rely on previously established market exclusion
mechanisms to implement their pledges within the Brazilian Amazon
comprise a special case among the existing ZDCs. In these situations,
relatively strong public governance has enabled a level of ZDC im-
plementation that conforms with many of our effectiveness criteria. The
Soy Moratorium and G4 Cattle Agreement tackle the two biggest de-
forestation-risk commodities in the region, have zero-gross deforesta-
tion targets and functional systems for ensuring compliance among
direct suppliers, and are targeted at a region with synergistic political
conditions, good geospatial forest information, and high forest-to-
agriculture conversion. Specifically, the establishment of the Soy
Moratorium and G4 Cattle Agreement are unique in the degree to which
pressure on companies by civil society to reduce deforestation aligned
with efforts to improve public forest governance from 2004 to 2015,
including increases in fines, monitoring, and enforcement of defor-
estation on private properties through the establishment a property
registration, real-time deforestation tracking, and credit restrictions
(Gibbs et al., 2015; le Polain de Waroux et al., 2017; Nepstad et al.,
2014). Market coverage is also high within the biome, covering up to
100% of the market in most Amazonian municipalities (SEI, 2018).
Existing evidence indicates that the Soy Moratorium, alongside
these complementary changes in public governance, did contribute to
reduced deforestation outside of public settlements within the Amazon
(Assunção and Gandour, 2013; Börner et al., 2015; Gibbs et al., 2015;
Hargrave and Kis-Katos, 2013). Many farmers have already exceeded
the forest clearing allowed under the national Forest Code, and com-
plying with company ZDCs is less onerous than meeting public reg-
ulations in these cases (Azevedo et al., 2015). Evidence of the effec-
tiveness of the G4 Cattle Agreement is more uncertain; it is likely
undermined by on-going deforestation by indirect cattle suppliers (Alix-
Garcia and Gibbs, 2017; Klingler et al., 2018). Yet, even companies that
have had success in eliminating deforestation within soybean supply
chains in the Amazon may not be contributing to broader reductions in
deforestation globally due to leakage of deforestation activities to other
regions (le Polain de Waroux et al., 2017).
In contrast to the Brazilian Amazon, public regulations in Indonesia
create conditions that reduce the regional effectiveness of ZDCs
(Carlson et al., 2018; Lambin et al., 2018). Recent legislation requires
that oil palm companies develop all available land within their plan-
tations (Ruysschaert and Salles, 2014), which may force oil palm
growers to choose between achieving legality and meeting their com-
mitments. If market exclusion mechanisms such as the Soy Moratorium
and G4 Cattle Agreement cannot be replicated outside of Brazil due to a
lack of property level deforestation monitoring and verification me-
chanisms, reliance on voluntary certifications where farmers “opt-in” to
verifying their compliance to maintain their status will be required.
However, differences in certification uptake in some sectors, as noted
above, highlights the fragility of commitments that implement through
this mechanism.
We found large differences in the commitment characteristics and
scope of palm specific and universal ZDCs, relative to beef specific
ZDCs, that highlight the complementarities between different criteria
outlined here. Palm specific and universal ZDCs are largely global and
thus rely more heavily on certification systems, including HCV, as
globally adaptable tools for implementing their commitment and dis-
tinguishing areas that cannot be cleared. The low adoption of certifi-
cation relative to market share of committed companies, and lack of
available HCV maps, explain why few palm specific and universal ZDCs
have immediate implementation deadlines. In contrast, the two beef
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specific ZDCs are focused on the Brazilian Amazon forest and rely on
the G4 Cattle Agreement market exclusion mechanism to implement
their commitment and identify areas that cannot be cleared. The G4
Cattle Agreement in turn relies on existing government capacity to map
and monitor deforestation on individual properties, which allows for
immediate implementation of their ZDCs.
Our analysis implies that many companies, in their rush to adopt
global and universal commitments, have prioritized commitment
characteristics, and in particular, forms of implementation that require
less divergence from existing practices. Almost half of the ZDCs allow
for continued agriculture and forestry expansion into forests (e.g., zero-
net forest loss) and rely on implementation tools that have been widely
tested (e.g., common forest identification tools such as HCV and certi-
fication systems to indicate compliance). Yet, as our analysis indicates,
these characteristics do not guarantee individual supply chain or re-
gional effectiveness, let alone global effectiveness.
These trends are not surprising, given that corporate sustainability
initiatives often aim for brand promotion and maintaining control over
their supply chains in the face of globalization and regulation risks,
rather than environmental benefits (Dauvergne and Lister, 2013). In-
deed, commitment adoption is more likely to occur when the cost of
meeting the commitment’s demands is low relative to the potential
reputational cost of not adopting the commitment (Bloomfield, 2014;
Dauvergne, 2017). Companies may believe that adopting weak global
commitments is a more cost effective or politically viable strategy to
alleviate brand concerns and NGO pressure than replicating the strong,
regional examples of the Soy Moratorium and G4 Cattle Agreement in
regions with challenging regulatory, financing, and political environ-
ments.
Improving the effectiveness of ZDCs hinges on strengthening public
governance capacity in forest risk regions, including reductions in il-
legal logging and planting, illegal land clearing, timber smuggling, and
tax evasion, as well as the transparency associated with these com-
modity flows and their governance (Gardner et al., 2018; Lambin et al.,
2018). In regions with low levels of state-led environmental govern-
ance, ZDCs can help push governments towards adopting more strin-
gent and regionally effective regulations by introducing actors to new
conservation policy concepts and tools and assisting with monitoring
and auditing training (Lambin and Thorkalson, 2018; Savilaakso et al.,
2017; Wijaya and Glasbergen, 2016). Ultimately there is a clear tension
between targeting ZDC implementation in regions with supportive
regulatory, political, and financing contexts, where it will be easier to
achieve individual supply chain and regional effectiveness, versus im-
plementing a ZDC in regions with less stringent existing governance,
where a change in activities could make a greater impact on reducing
deforestation globally (Garrett et al., 2016).
Many of the compliance mechanisms associated with ZDC im-
plementation are costly (Ruysschaert and Salles, 2014; Smit et al.,
2015), and may be overwhelming or inaccessible for smaller companies
and farmers (Auld et al., 2008b; Glasbergen, 2018). If efforts are not
taken by companies making ZDCs to proactively help smaller compa-
nies and farmers comply with their ZDCs, these policies are less likely to
be regionally effective. Additionally, high compliance costs in the re-
gions were ZDCs are implemented could result in a loss of competitive
advantage in those regions, encouraging companies to shift their
sourcing to other locales (Villoria and Hertel, 2011).
To reduce the costs associated with monitoring and verifying zero-
deforestation within supply chains, some actors are now advocating
jurisdictional “Zero-deforestation Zone” approaches whereby compa-
nies would commit to sourcing from jurisdictions that have established
regional programs to reduce deforestation and are on a downward
trajectory toward zero emissions from deforestation by 2020 (Meyer
and Miller, 2015). Proponents of this approach suggest that economies
of scale (reduced per-unit costs) for deforestation monitoring could be
achieved if companies from multiple sectors work together with local
governments to leverage international funding and establish shared
mechanisms for tracking deforestation (Meyer and Miller, 2015). While
promising in theory, to the best of our knowledge no such mechanisms
currently exist in practice. Getting companies from different sectors to
agree to zero-deforestation sourcing behaviors may be unrealistic,
particularly in regions where the domestic market is large and diffuse
and where consumer willingness to pay for conservation is low, even if
public governance structures are largely supportive (Bakaki and
Bernauer, 2016; le Polain de Waroux et al., 2017).
6.2. Remaining uncertainties
This work is a starting point for understanding the impacts of ZDCs
and ways to improve their effectiveness, based on theoretical reasoning
of their potential outcomes. Our understanding of the general validity
of the theoretical pathways discussed above, like other evaluations of
voluntary company policies, is limited by the existing data and evi-
dence base (van der Ven and Cashore, 2018). Spatial, actor, and tem-
poral spillovers associated with different commitment designs remains
largely unassessed. Our analysis of the expected effectiveness of ex-
isting commitments is limited by the Forest 500 assessment data. These
data rely on company self-reporting and are biased toward a relatively
small number of larger companies with greater global visibility re-
garding their supply chain activities (Jopke and Schoneveld, 2018).
There are numerous research gaps and data needs remaining to
better understand the real world impacts of ZDCs moving forward.
Detailed analysis of the market share and spatial footprint of these
commitments is needed to quantify and model existing commitments’
potential effectiveness with more specificity. Spatially explicit, me-
chanistic models with robust counterfactuals that link changes in in-
centives arising from different commitment characteristics to changes
in land cover at the level of major deforestation frontiers are required to
identify optimal commitment designs for regional effectiveness. To
understand the magnitude and location of spillovers that could under-
mine global effectiveness, spatially explicit models should be linked
dynamically to multi-regional computational general equilibrium
models. Because the implementation aspects of ZDCs largely remain
unclear, fieldwork and case studies are still urgently needed to analyze
understand how commitments are operationalized and affect producers
and processes of governance on the ground.
7. Conclusion
Our results suggest that existing ZDCs have the potential to be
moderately effective in reducing deforestation within targeted supply
chains and regions, but leave substantial room for improvement with
regards to achieving global reductions in deforestation. ZDCs can have
a greater impact on global forest conservation if they include zero-gross
targets with immediate deadlines, clear sanction-based implementation
mechanisms, and traceability to indirect suppliers, particularly within
cattle supply chains. The need to improve and standardize existing
ZDCs underscores the importance of civil society initiatives like the
Accountability Framework (www.accountability-framework.org),
which aims to create a common set of definitions, norms, and guidelines
to promote adoption of more effective ZDCs. However, efforts to in-
crease the stringency of ZDCs could discourage wider adoption.
Policymakers should be mindful of this interaction since global effec-
tiveness will depend on both the effectiveness of each individual
commitment and the extent of adoption. Improvements to existing
commitments are likely to hinge on simultaneous improvements in
public governance that enable greater property level monitoring of
compliance with deforestation cut-offs (Vogel, 2010).
Enthusiasm for voluntary environmental policies should be viewed
with caution, since they may merely advantage the most powerful
companies and reduce the agency of affected local communities by
moving control of deforestation activities to market forces (Larsen
et al., 2018). Thus, improving the effectiveness of ZDCs should not be
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used a substitute for strengthening public regulations in forest risk re-
gions. Voluntary policies may instead be used as a testing ground for
identifying mechanisms that can successfully control deforestation and
be ratcheted up to legally binding behaviors (Lambin and Thorkalson,
2018; Utting, 2005). To achieve these ends, companies and civil society
can assist governments in establishing monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms that enable the adoption of more stringent implementation
mechanisms and pressure governments to adopt their own rigorous
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